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they interpret reneging as a deviation by the employer from mutually benefi-
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“If your wage is cut a bit, you’d start to misbehave in your job, but you wouldn’t leave.”
C. A. Pissarides1
1 Introduction
In practice, it seems easy: an employer advertises a job, specifying the wage. Job seekers
apply and are invited to interviews. The employer selects an applicant who is then hired
at the specified wage. While this description fits millions of hirings every year, the process
is not fully understood by labour economists: why do employers not pay a lower wage
than they had advertised? After all, they could. Employers are not legally bound by
their advertisement, they can say that the advertised wage was meant only for the ideal
candidate. And employers have an incentive to pay less in order to save on wage costs.
Of course, many models in labour economics include a hiring process with advertise-
ments. Directed search models (also referred to as models of competitive search) have
become the standard theoretical approach in this context. They capture a trade-off em-
ployers face: a high wage advertisement attracts many applicants but is costly when it
has to be paid, while a low wage advertisement may be cheaper but might attract fewer
applicants. However, directed search models do not explain why employers cannot have
the best of both worlds by advertising a high wage and then paying a low wage. Instead
of an economic explanation, they almost always invoke a commitment assumption, which
says that employers are somehow unable to renege on the wages (or contracts or mecha-
nisms) they advertised. In their survey of this literature, Rogerson, Shimer and Wright
(2005) find “it is a strong assumption to say that agents commit to the posted terms of
trade” and consider it “a potential disadvantage” for this entire class of models.2
It would be wrong to dismiss the problem as a theoretical detail. Not only does the
commitment assumption take the place of an economic explanation. Commitment is also
crucial for the functioning of directed search models, so that their results hinge on a strong
assumption. To see this, note first that rational job seekers will ignore advertised wages
that are unrelated to the wages employers actually pay. Advertisements therefore become
meaningless, and job seekers might just as well apply randomly. When they then attend
an interview without a clue about the wage, they might find the wage so low that they
regret coming to the interview. Suppose they incur some costs from attending interviews,
such as travel costs. By the time of the interview, costs are sunk, and employers do not
need to reimburse them. To minimise wage costs, employers only pay as much as job
seekers can obtain elsewhere by returning to job search.
Directed search without commitment therefore leads to one robust theoretical out-
come: every employer pays job seekers the expected value of job search, so that job
seekers are not better off than before the interview. On the contrary, they have incurred
1On April 9th, 2008 in Birmingham.
2See Rogerson et al. (2005), p. 976.
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search costs they are not reimbursed for. Forward-looking workers thus decide not to
attend interviews at all, and the labour market breaks down. This surprising outcome
is known as the Diamond paradox, following Peter Diamond’s (1971) seminal contribu-
tion. It is frequently encountered in search models, and some remedies the literature has
produced will be reviewed below. In most directed search models, however, the commit-
ment assumption is all that protects them from degenerating into Diamond’s outcome
(see Tudo´n Maldonado, 2016).
This paper. This paper proposes an intuitive economic explanation why employers
do not pay workers less than advertised. The employer’s profit from the employment
relationship will depend on the effort exerted by the worker. If the employer reneges on
the advertisement, the worker responds by exerting little effort. Such “work to rule” or
“white strike” can leave the employer worse off than if the advertised wage was paid. The
employer therefore prefers to pay the advertised wage. Although the advertisements are
cheap talk, they turn out to be accurate.
In order to formalise this reasoning, the model in this paper extends a directed search
model beyond the point in time when employer and job seeker match. The post-match
interaction during the employment relationship is modelled as a repeated game with
an infinite horizon. In each period, the worker chooses effort and the employer pays a
wage. In this set-up, mutually beneficial behaviour can be sustained as much as mutually
detrimental behaviour. The worker does not know in advance which situation will prevail
but would not want to exert high effort only to be paid a low wage. Looking for clues,
the worker bases expectations on the advertised wage. If the employer tries to renege
on the advertisement, this will be treated as a deviation by the worker, leading to the
mutually detrimental situation. Employers then optimally choose not to renege: the
model generates their commitment to advertisements endogenously.
Directed search models are therefore not necessarily threatened by the Diamond para-
dox, which is the theoretical contribution of this paper. To examine whether the reason-
ing also aligns with employers’ and workers’ behaviour in practice, the paper surveys the
available evidence. In particular, some large-scale empirical studies recently examined the
reasons why employers appear to refrain in general from cutting wages. Among several
competing theories, the results support primarily the view that employers fear the effects
of wage cuts on worker morale and productivity. In light of these findings, the explanation
for employers’ commitment proposed in this paper appears plausible and may represent
the main motivation for employers’ behaviour in practice.
Related literature. The contributions most closely related to this paper all take issue
with the assumption of commitment by employers. Coles (2001) introduces a version of the
wage-posting model by Burdett and Mortensen (1998) without commitment. Employers
in the latter model cannot advertise high wages to attract more applicants but can pay
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high wages in order to also recruit workers who are already employed elsewhere and
demand higher wages. However, once an employed job seeker has left the old job, the
new employer could reduce the wage. Coles (2001) argues this does not happen because
higher wages also retain workers - the additional wage costs can be recouped from saving
on the costs of staff turnover. Endogenous commitment arises because employers fear that
workers leave, while in this paper, employers fear that they work with low productivity.
Mortensen (2003) also acknowledges the problem of commitment. He suggests that
employers will not renege because they fear for their reputation among job seekers, so that
they would have trouble recruiting in the future. While this reasoning is yet to be spelled
out in a model, it requires that sufficiently many job seekers learn how a given employer
has treated previous applicants. It is not clear how this can happen in practice. After all,
employees have little to gain from publicly complaining about past treatment, and firms
whose reputation is tarnished can change name. The empirical studies surveyed in this
paper also consider reputation concerns but find little evidence for them. The reasoning
in Coles (2001) receives more empirical support, but the available evidence appears to
support most the explanation proposed in this paper.
Masters (2010) presents a directed search model in which employers can use a legal
minimum wage or co-operation with unions as commitment devices: applicants are thereby
reassured that the actual wage will not fall below a certain floor. This leaves at least two
questions. How can employers commit to advertisements of higher wages, and why do
employers not pay less than advertised if they operate in labour market segments without
unions or minimum wages?
A contribution by Menzio (2007) is closely related to this paper because it obtains
a similar result in a different search context. In his model, employers can attract more
applicants by advertising some wage-relevant information, much like in a directed search
model. In contrast to most directed search models, employers and job seekers bargain
over the wage in the interview. Although employers are not committed to their adver-
tisements, those who advertise more positive information end up paying higher wages
because they face tougher bargaining behaviour from job seekers: more positive adver-
tisements make job seekers more demanding. A key parallel to this paper is that the effect
of advertisements on job seekers’ expectations creates a link between advertisements and
actual wages. An important difference is that commitment is not needed for search mod-
els with bargaining to function - the Diamond paradox only complicates the matter when
employers choose wages unilaterally.
Recently, Kim and Kircher (2015) questioned whether commitment is really needed
for the functioning of directed search models. Their results imply that commitment is
not necessary whenever employers award jobs to workers through a first-price auction.
While auction-like situations seem to sometimes occur in labour markets, they have likely
remained rare in comparison to wages that are simply set by employers. Then the question
remains why employers do not pay less than advertised when they can set wages.
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Introducing advertisements that employers do not renege on is one of several ways to
avoid the Diamond paradox in search models. Other approaches in the literature typi-
cally assume imperfectly informed employers or somehow ensure that employers compete
directly for workers despite search frictions. Burdett and Mortensen (1998) is a case in
point, as their model relies heavily on the assumption that employers do not know the
employment status of job seekers visiting them. Carrillo-Tudela (2009) surveys empirical
evidence against this assumption.
Direct competition for workers has been introduced by allowing for multiple offers to
workers as in Burdett and Judd (1983). However, then the question arises again why
employers should not renege once the worker has come to them and has foregone the
competing offer from another employer - unless the other employer remains a “contact”
whose offer may be recalled at any time, as in Carrillo-Tudela, Menzio and Smith (2011).
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 develops a directed search model without
commitment, demonstrates the Diamond paradox in this setting, but then extends the
model by employment relationships. Section 3 shows how consequences for worker effort
lead employers not to renege on their advertisements, so that the Diamond paradox no
longer results. This section also discusses how the paper’s reasoning goes beyond efficiency
wages. Evidence on both pre-match and post-match behaviour as modelled in this paper
is surveyed in Section 4 before section 5 concludes.
2 Model
The model adapts Diamond’s (1971) set-up to labour markets by introducing wage adver-
tisements and repeated interactions between worker and employer during the employment
relationship. Directed search as in Montgomery (1991) and Burdett et al. (2001) is used
to account for the role of wage advertisements in agents’ pre-match behaviour. The
post-match interaction during the employment relationship is set in the game-theoretic
environment of Malcomson and McLeod (1989). While directed search is typically set in
a static framework, a unified treatment of pre- and post-match behaviour here requires a
dynamic setting throughout.
Time is discrete with an infinite horizon. The only agents are a large number of
identical employers who can employ at most one worker and a large number of identical
workers endowed with an indivisible unit of labour. Agents can be in three states: in
search for a match, in an interview, and in an employment relationship. Unmatched
agents can transition into an employment relationship via an interview, and they can
leave an interview or an employment relationship to search again. Positive payoffs can
be earned only in matches. Employers and workers discount future payoffs with discount
factors βF ∈ (0, 1) and βW ∈ (0, 1), respectively.
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2.1 Pre-match behaviour
A marketplace exists for employers and workers to search and to match, while matched
agents leave the marketplace. To obtain a steady state environment, it is assumed that one
employer enters the marketplace for each employer who leaves, and likewise for workers.
However, a steady state is not needed for the qualitative results in this paper. In order
to have a clear notion of the sequence of events, any period t is divided into subperiods
t0, t1, and t2. During a pre-match period 0, unmatched employers and workers flow
into the marketplace in subperiod 00. Including those who have remained unmatched in
the marketplace, a total of m employers seek to recruit among a total of n unemployed
workers, and both m and n are large numbers.
Wage advertisements In subperiod 01, each employer in the marketplace publishes a
job advertisement at negligible cost. The advertisement specifies a wage wt per period
of work and the work input or ‘effort’ that is expected. This information allows workers
to derive which benefit the vacancy might hold for them: their benefit bt per period is
defined as the wage net of their disutility of work d(st) (so that bt = wt − d(st)), where
st ∈ R+ is the effort exerted by the worker. Let b˜ denote the benefit implicitly advertised
by the employer. Having observed the advertisements, workers decide which employer to
apply to in subperiod 02. Workers prefer jobs with a high benefit, but they are aware that
other workers are equally attracted to these jobs, so that the probability of obtaining a
job with a high benefit is low. A job with a low benefit attracts few applicants, but the
probability of obtaining it is accordingly high.
As the situation is the same for each of the identical workers, each will apply with
the same probability σ to a given employer advertising b˜. With probability (1 − σ)n,
all workers apply elsewhere, so that this employer receives at least one application with
probability 1 − (1 − σ)n. Among several (identical) applicants, the employer selects one
applicant at random. Then the probability ρ that a given applicant is selected for an
interview next period is 1− (1− σ)n divided by the expected number of applicants:
(1) ρ =
1− (1− σ)n
nσ
Due to the competition for workers, the employer will only have applicants if the expected
utility of applying to this employer is at least Φ, a level that is offered to applicants
elsewhere in the marketplace. This expected utility depends on the advertised benefit
and the chances of obtaining the job. With Φ(bt) denoting the value to the worker of
being in a match that provides the per-period benefit bt, workers will only be interested
in the employer’s advertisement if visiting this employer promises at least as much as is
offered elsewhere in the marketplace:
(2) ρβWΦ(b˜)− kW ≥ βWΦ− kW or ρΦ(b˜) ≥ Φ
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where kW is an out-of-pocket search cost that a worker incurs from attending an interview.
Using Λ to denote the value to the employer of searching for a worker and Θ to denote
the value of hosting an interview, the employer’s situation is described by:
(3) Λ = (1− σ)nβFΛ + [1− (1− σ)n]βFΘ
In words, the employer will host an interview next period if there is at least one applicant,
and will otherwise search. The employer chooses b˜ to maximise Λ subject to equation (2).
Workers’ search Having observed all employers’ advertisements in subperiod 01, each
worker applies to one employer in subperiod 02. With probability ρ, a given worker is
invited to an interview in subperiod 10. Let Ω be the value to the worker of being in an
interview. Then the value Y to the worker of searching in the marketplace is
(4) Y = (1− ρ)βWY + ρβW max [Ω− kW , Y ]
Equation (4) says that the worker is not invited to an interview with probability 1 − ρ;
when invited, however, the worker can choose between going to the interview, which
carries the value βW (Ω− kW ), and not going, which carries the value βWY .
Interviews If at least one worker does apply to the employer in subperiod 02, the em-
ployer will host an interview for a randomly selected applicant in the following subperiod
10. By coming to the interview, the worker incurs the search cost kW > 0. In the interview,
the employer makes a take-it-or-leave-it wage offer wˆt under perfect information. This
structure corresponds to Diamond’s (1971) setting where sellers unilaterally set prices and
buyers only learn the price after coming to the seller at some search cost.
If the worker rejects the wage offer, she will return to the marketplace. In this case,
subperiods 11 and 12 will be like subperiods 01 and 02, for both the employer and the
worker. It is not possible for the worker to recall the employer’s offer ex post. If the worker
accepts the offer in the interview, worker and employer match and exit the marketplace.
In this case, subperiods 11 and 12 will be part of an employment relationship (see below).
An interview period can thus turn into either a match or into another period on the
marketplace, depending on whether or not the worker accepts. The worker’s situation in
the interview can thus be summarised as
(5) Ω = max[Φ(bt), Y ]
where bt is determined by the employer’s wage offer wˆt. That is, the wage offer will be
rejected if the worker prefers further search to a match with this benefit bt. Let Π denote
the value to the employer of being in a match. Then the interview has the value Θ = Π
to the employer if the worker accepts, but it has the value Θ = Λ if the worker rejects.
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Diamond paradox It is quickly demonstrated that the Diamond paradox arises in this
model as in Diamond’s (1971) model. Noting that ρβWY cancels on the right-hand side
of equation (4), it can be rearranged into
(6) Y =
ρβW
1− βW max [Ω− kW − Y, 0]
This formulation shows that a worker who is invited to the interview will only go if
Ω − Y > kW , so that any gain from the interview is at least worth the cost of going
there. However, consider the employer’s choice of wˆt in the interview. To minimise wage
costs, the employer offers a wage such that the benefit bt = wˆt − d(s) leaves the worker
indifferent between accepting and rejecting, so that Φ(bt) = Y . This benefit (or a little
bit more to tip the balance) is all the employer needs to offer for the worker to accept in
the interview. It follows from equation (5) that Ω = Y , and the worker does not recoup
the cost of going to the interview. For a forward-looking worker, it would therefore be
irrational to go to the interview, and equation (6) accordingly simplifies to Y = 0: since
the worker does not go, a match never happens and no benefit is ever received.
This argument generalises to any worker and any period. As it does not depend on
the value of ρ, even a single worker without competition from others (i.e. ρ = 1) would
obtain Y = 0. The result is complete market failure: as the search costs would never be
recouped, no worker engages in search, and no match is ever observed. This result of an
inactive market as the unique equilibrium when there are search costs is known as the
Diamond paradox. Its root cause are thus costs that are incurred ex ante and become
sunk costs by the time a worker visits an employer, so that the employer has no reason
to reimburse the worker for these costs.
In this context, wage advertisements might be a remedy. If employers advertised
wages to workers before the interview, this might build a bridge over the point when
search costs become sunk costs: workers would only visit employers whose advertised
wage offer suggests that they will at least be reimbursed for their search costs. However,
this critically depends on advertisements being truthful, so that no employer reneges on
the advertised wage offer once a worker has come along.
Yet it is still the case that the worker’s costs are sunk by the time the interview takes
place, and it is not clear why an employer should then not renege on the advertisement
and set Φ(bt) = Y after all. While the employer would like to induce worker participa-
tion through advertisements, the employer’s optimal behaviour is time-inconsistent: once
workers participate the employer reneges. Aware of this inconsistency, workers then do not
trust advertisements and do not participate. Hence advertisements per se are not enough
to avoid the Diamond paradox, which is why nearly all models of directed search make
the assumption that employers are committed to advertisements, i.e. somehow unable to
renege on them. This assumption is not made in this paper.
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2.2 Post-match behaviour
From directed search models, the model in this paper differs primarily by including agents’
behaviour after they match: the employment relationship is modelled as repeated and
dynamic productive interaction between worker and employer, rather than as a one-off
exchange transaction. Production technology is identical across employers and uses labour
as the only input. The worker produces perfectly measurable but not verifiable output
p(st) per period during the match, where p(·) is a strictly concave function and p(0) = 0.
The worker’s disutility from work d(·) is a strictly convex function and d(0) = 0.
Stage game As noted before, if the worker accepts the wage offer wˆt in the interview
in subperiod 10, worker and employer match and leave the marketplace. In subperiod
11, the worker then chooses effort st and produces for the employer. The employer pays
the actual wage wt only in subperiod 1
2. This structure constitutes an extensive game in
which agents move sequentially and their actions combine to an outcome (wˆt, st, wt) ∈ R3+.
Letting the price for output be 1, so that p(st) is also the monetary value of output, the
per-period payoff of the employer is p(st)− wt and that of the worker is bt = wt − d(st).
Time structure During a further period of the employment relationship, the actions
and their timing are exactly as in the interview period, except that the worker does not
incur any search cost. Keeping in mind that agents transition from a period on the
marketplace to an interview period only if the invited worker comes to the interview, the
time structure can be summarised as in Figure 1.
Repeated game Unless it breaks up, the match is an infinite repetition of the stage
game. The histories in subperiods t0, t1, and t2 of a match period are
h(t0) = {b˜, (wˆ1, s1, w1), (wˆ2, s2, w2), . . . , (wˆt−1, st−1, wt−1)}
h(t1) = h(t0) ∪ {wˆt} and h(t2) = h(t1) ∪ {st}
with the initial history given by the employer’s advertisement, h(10) = {b˜}. Match break-
up is endogenous: a rejection of wˆt by the worker terminates the match, and both the
worker and the employer can decide at the end of each full period whether to terminate
the match. The match will continue next period only if neither side chooses to terminate
it. If the match is terminated, both the worker and the employer return to search on the
marketplace, which carries values Y and Λ, respectively. The value Π(st) to the employer
of being in a match can thus be expressed as
(7) Π(st) = p(st)− wt + αβFΠ(st+1) + (1− α)βFΛ
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where α is an indicator that equals one if the match continues and otherwise equals zero.
Similarly, the value Φ(bt) to the worker of being in a match can be expressed as
(8) Φ(bt) = wt − d(st) + αβWΦ(bt+1) + (1− α)βWY
The employer’s preferences in the infinitely repeated game are defined on the set of infinite
sequences of stage game outcomes and satisfy weak separability. Concretely, they are given
by δ-discounting, and equivalently for the worker’s preferences. Finally, the level of effort
that maximises the surplus of the worker’s production is denoted
(9) s¯ = arg max
st
p(st)− d(st)
To ensure the existence of gains from trade between worker and employer, it is assumed
(10)
p(s¯)− d(s¯)
1− βW > kW
which says that the worker’s search costs can be recouped by the present discounted value
of match production over the infinite horizon.
Figure 1: Time structure of pre-match and post-match behaviour
3 Equilibrium
This section identifies an equilibrium in which workers do go to interviews, match with
employers, and are paid the same wages as employers advertised. Crucially, truthful ad-
vertisements do not reflect a mere assumption that employers are committed to their
advertisements, but result endogenously from employers’ optimal behaviour. In a nut-
shell, this result arises from the interdependence of pre- and post-match behaviour: if the
employer reneged on the advertisement, co-operation during the employment relationship
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would be undermined, with adverse effects on profits. This leads employers to only ad-
vertise wages they are prepared to pay. Since workers can therefore trust advertisements,
they come to interviews as soon as advertisements promise sufficiently high wages.
The section proceeds by stating the equilibrium, whose parts are then proven one
at a time through a series of lemmas. In a way that will be clarified by Lemma 4, the
equilibrium depends on employers being sufficiently patient, so that βF is high enough.
As behaviour in this equilibrium is time-invariant, time subscripts are dropped. Let
µ(b = b˜|b˜) denote the worker’s subjective probability of obtaining benefit b = b˜ in the
employment relationship when b˜ has been advertised by the employer. Since such beliefs
are involved, the equilibrium of the model is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE).
Proposition 1 (Endogenous commitment). For βF large enough, a PBE exists in
which
(i) each employer chooses the same advertisement b˜ that at least reimburses workers
for their search costs
(ii) workers trust all advertisements: µ(b = b˜|b˜) = 1
(iii) the SPE profile (wˆ, s, w) = (b˜+ d(s¯), s¯, b˜+ d(s¯)) is played in every match period, so
that matches do not break up
(iv) workers engage in search and match at the first opportunity.
The equilibrium comprises the main results of the model: in contrast to the Diamond
paradox, workers here engage in search (part iv) because each employer advertises at
least the lowest benefit that still reimburses workers for their search costs (part i); as
advertisements are truthful (part iii), workers are right to trust them (part ii).
3.1 Pre-match equilibrium
For the proposed equilibrium, the values that various states carry for worker and employer
can be determined. That workers go to interviews in equilibrium implies Ω− kW ≥ Y in
equation (4). Solving for Y , the value of search to the worker, one finds
(11) Y =
ρ
β−1W − (1− ρ)
[Φ(b)− kW ]
where Φ(b) replaces Ω because every interview in equilibrium turns into a match. Since
matches in the proposed equilibrium do not break up, α = 1 in equation (8), so that the
value to the worker of being in a match is
(12) Φ(b) =
w − d
1− βW
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With α = 1 in equation (7), the value to the employer of being in a match is found as
(13) Π(s) =
p(s)− w
1− βF
As every interview in the proposed equilibrium becomes a match, Θ = Π(s). Then one
can solve equation (3) for Λ:
(14) Λ =
1− (1− σ)n
β−1F − (1− σ)n
p(s)− w
1− βF
Recall that Λ is the value of search to the employer, i.e. the value at the time when the
employer chooses an advertisement. In the proposed equilibrium, the employer does not
renege on the advertised wage. By choosing the wage for the advertisement, the employer
therefore actually determines w in equation (14). The employer seeks to maximise Λ by
setting w as low as possible, but also needs to attract applicants in competition with other
employers. Formally, the employer’s optimisation problem is to maximise Λ subject to
the constraint in equation (2). Using equation (12) to solve the constraint for w gives
(15) w =
1− βW
ρ
Φ + d(s)
Substituting for w in equation (14), the employer’s optimisation problem becomes
(16) max Λ =
1− (1− σ)n
β−1F − (1− σ)n
1
1− βF
[
p(s)− 1− βW
ρ
Φ− d(s)
]
This expression indirectly depends on w because σ, the probability that a given worker
applies to this employer, depends on the wage advertisement. Hence one can maximise Λ
with respect to σ, noting from equation (1) that ρ is a function of σ.
Lemma 1 (Employers’ choice of advertisement). All employers advertise the same
(17) b˜ = max
 (1− βF ) nm(p(s)− d(s))[
1− (1− 1
m
)n] [(
1− 1
m
)1−n − βF (1 + n−1m )] , (1− βW )kW

Proof. See appendix. 
Employers choose an advertisement b˜ that offers workers a share of the surplus p(s)−d(s)
(the first expression in equation (17)) unless the minimum that workers need to be offered
for them to incur the search costs is larger (the second expression). In the derivation of
these expressions, σ is replaced by 1
m
since, given that all employers advertise the same b˜,
workers apply to one employer at random. By consequence, both expressions in equation
(17) depend on n and m.
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Figure 2 shows how the first expression varies with market tightness, defined as the
ratio of employers to workers m
n
, for various values of βF , βW and kW . The first expression
continuously increases with market tightness: greater competition among employers for
workers drives up their choice of advertisement b˜. For high values of market tightness,
the advertised share of p(s)− d(s) approaches one, so that workers are offered almost all
the surplus from the match. The second expression does not depend on market tightness,
so that the first expression exceeds the second expression for sufficiently high market
tightness. That is, the market has to be tight enough for employers to offer workers more
than the minimum that would just reimburse their search costs.
Figure 2: Dependence of employers’ advertisement b˜ on market tightness
(a) For p(s)− d(s) = 1, kW = 0.5 and mn ≤ 2 (b) For p(s)− d(s) = 1, kW = 0.5 and mn ≤ 20
To formally characterise the behaviour of the first expression in equation (17), consider
a large labour market. Whenever n and m are large,
(
1− 1
m
)n
is well approximated by
e−
n
m and n−1
m
≈ n
m
. Then the expression becomes
(18)
(1− βF ) nm(p(s)− d(s))[
1− e− nm ] [e nm − βF (1 + nm)]
By L’Hoˆpital’s rule, the limits as n
m
→∞ or n
m
→ 0 in this expression are the same as for
a ratio of the numerator’s and denominator’s derivatives with respect to n
m
, denoted H:
(19) H =
(1− βF )[p(s)− d(s)]
e
n
m − βF
(
n
m
e−
n
m + 1
)
The limits are therefore found as
(20) lim
n
m
→∞
H → 0 and lim
n
m
→0
H → p(s)− d(s)
Since n
m
is the inverse of market tightness, workers are offered almost the entire match
surplus when market tightness becomes very high, but would be offered nothing when
market tightness is very low if it were not for the second expression in equation (17).
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Lemma 1 proves part (i) of Proposition 1: when employers choose their advertisements,
they take workers’ search costs and competing advertisements from other employers into
account. However, whether employers pay the wages they advertised is an entirely differ-
ent question. Without commitment by employers, workers need good reasons to believe
that employers will not renege on their advertisements, otherwise it is not rational for
them to visit employers. In this paper, post-match behaviour endogenously leads employ-
ers to pay the advertised wages (see below). The effect of this endogenous post-match
behaviour on workers’ pre-match behaviour is the same as that of a commitment assump-
tion: workers trust employers’ advertisements and do visit them.
Lemma 2 (Workers’ participation conditional on advertisements). Given the
post-match behaviour specified in part (iii) of Proposition 1, workers trust employers’
advertisements, engage in search and match at the first opportunity.
Proof. See appendix. 
Lemma 2 proves parts (ii) and (iv) of Proposition 1, taking the other parts as given. The
next section turns to part (iii) of the Proposition.
3.2 Post-match equilibrium
Equilibrium in the repeated interaction during the employment relationship has a simple
game-theoretic structure: employer and worker can behave in a mutually beneficial way,
but they can also harm each other. Both situations can be supported as subgame perfect
equilibria (SPE), where the mutually beneficial SPE is maintained by the threat to move
to the mutually detrimental SPE. As the advertisement has in effect defined what the
mutually beneficial SPE entails, employers will have to pay the advertised wage if they
want to stay in the mutually beneficial SPE. Lemma 3 begins this reasoning with the
mutually detrimental situation:
Lemma 3 (Non-cooperation). Provided employers are sufficiently patient, the repeated
game between employer and worker in an employment relationship has a SPE in which
the worker only exerts effort s < s¯ in every period t that leaves the employer indifferent
between continuing the match and deviating by not paying the wage and returning to
search. The employer pays the wage
(21) w =
ρ
β−1W − (1− ρ)
[
b˜− (1− βW )kW
]
+ d(s)
in every period t, also leaving the worker indifferent between continuing the match and
returning to search. The choice of wˆ is indeterminate, and employers will be sufficiently
patient if βF ≥ w/[Π(s) − Λ]. The worker’s payoff is given by Φ(w − d(s)) = Y and the
employer’s payoff by Π(s) = w/βFΛ.
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Proof. See appendix. 
The worker’s behaviour in the mutually detrimental situation can be interpreted as “white
strike”, only working the minimum needed to keep the job. The next lemma characterises
behaviour in the mutually beneficial SPE and confirms that payoffs for the worker and
the employer are strictly higher than in the mutually detrimental SPE. By consequence,
the threat of moving to the mutually detrimental SPE can prevent deviations from the
mutually beneficial situation. Lemma 4 thereby proves part (iii) of Proposition 1:
Lemma 4 (Cooperation). Provided employers are sufficiently patient such that
(22) βF ≥ max
[
b˜+ d(s¯)− w
Π(s¯)− Π(s) ,
w
Π(s)− Λ
]
the repeated game between employer and worker in an employment relationship also has
a SPE in which the worker exerts effort s¯ and the employer pays the wage b˜ + d(s¯) > w
so that the profile (wˆ, s, w) = (b˜ + d(s¯), s¯, b˜ + d(s¯)) is played in every match period. The
worker therefore obtains the advertised benefit b˜. This SPE is sustained by the threat of
moving to the SPE in Lemma 3 or leaving the match following a deviation: as
Φ(b˜) > Φ(w − d(s)) = Y and Π(s¯) > Π(s) > Λ
neither worker nor employer have an incentive to deviate and matches do not break up.
Proof. See appendix. 
Lemma 4 completes the proof of Proposition 1. Crucially, it is optimal for employers
in the SPE in Lemma 4 to pay the advertised wage in order to avoid “white strike” or
match break-up. Instead, this SPE elicits the surplus-maximising effort level s¯ from the
worker. Similar mutually beneficial SPE may also be sustained for other effort levels,
as raising effort above s already increases the surplus. However, the SPE in Lemma 4
entails the highest payoff to the employer given that the advertised benefit b˜ has to be
paid. Comparing payoffs for the employer in different SPE simplifies to comparing the
per-period payoff p(s) − w = p(s) − b − d(s). Given b = b˜, consider the first expression
for b˜ in equation (17). Let λ denote the inverse of its denominator, which is a constant.
Then the employer’s maximisation problem can be written as
max
s
p(s)− λ(1− βF ) n
m
[p(s)− d(s)]− d(s)
The first-order condition yields[
1− λ(1− βF ) n
m
] [δp(s)
δs
− δd(s)
δs
]
= 0
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As this leads to the same condition on effort as in equation (9), s = s¯ is optimal for the
employer. With regards to the second expression for b˜ in equation (17), it suffices to note
that it is a constant, so that maximisation of p(s) − b − d(s) immediately leads to the
same condition as in equation (9). Therefore, the employer chooses the SPE in Lemma 4
among all mutually beneficial SPE by demanding s = s¯ from the worker.
3.3 Discussion
Much of the reasoning in this section is not new at all. As one of the first, Solow (1979)
formulated the theory that employers avoid wage cuts because they lead to bad morale
and low productivity. More generally, a positive link between high wages and high worker
effort, known as efficiency wages, has been the focus of an entire literature. That the logic
of efficiency wages might not only sustain high wages but also make employers deliver on
promises of high wages is, however, a novel approach taken in this paper. This extension
merely requires that workers react very similarly to a broken promise of a high wage as
to a wage cut.
In this paper’s directed search model, job advertisements therefore take on a second
role, compared to other directed search models. They are not only a tool for employers
to attract candidates, but also set a benchmark against which the employer’s behaviour
can be evaluated. If the wage actually paid falls short of the benchmark, the worker’s
goodwill or trust towards the employer may be lost, an implicit contract may be violated,
or an arrangement of gift exchange may be undermined.
Whatever the intuition, the benchmark matters as long as candidates arrive expecting
the advertised wage and treat a different wage as a deviation from cooperative behaviour.
This simple link is at the core of the model in this paper, and it is the only link between pre-
and post-match behaviour: by fixing workers’ beliefs, the advertisements predetermine
the mutually beneficial SPE in the employment relationship. While the advertisements
themselves are cheap talk, reneging on them amounts to deviating from the SPE. This
interplay of advertisements and efficiency wages produces endogenous commitment in this
paper’s directed search model and resolves the Diamond paradox.
This solution to the Diamond paradox does not rely on relaxing Diamond’s (1971)
assumption of perfect information. Imperfect information is at the core of several well-
known solutions, including those that involve some form of efficiency wages. In Burdett
and Mortensen (1998), employers pay higher wages than necessary to unemployed job
seekers only because they cannot distinguish them from employed job seekers. In Shapiro
and Stiglitz (1984), employers cannot always observe the worker’s effort and therefore pay
higher wages to discourage shirking.
Using the model in this paper, the role of this assumption in Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1984) is quickly demonstrated. A worker who shirks by choosing s = 0 is only detected
with probability q < 1. Whenever shirking is detected, the match breaks up, but as long
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as it is not detected, the match continues and the worker saves d(s¯). For the worker not
to shirk, the payoff from working needs to outweigh the payoff from shirking:
(23) b+ βWΦ(b) ≥ (1− q) [d(s¯) + b+ βWΦ(b)] + qβWY
With b+ βWΦ(b) = Φ(b) and substituting for Y from equation (11), this becomes:
(24) Φ(b) ≥ 1
1− η
[
1− q
q
d(s¯)− ηkW
]
where η = βWρ/[β
−1
W − (1− ρ)]. The search costs kW are covered by this payoff Φ(b) if
1− q
q
d(s¯) ≥ kW
This may hold for q low enough, but cannot hold for q = 1. Efficiency wages in this paper
are modelled differently and do not require an assumption of imperfect information.
4 Evidence
This section surveys a wealth of empirical evidence and concludes that every main element
of the model in this paper is relevant in practice, or even most common. In particular,
several recent studies confirm that employers refrain from cutting wages because they fear
the effects on workers’ productivity (see Section 4.2). This result will carry over to paying
less than advertised if workers use the advertisement as a benchmark, as recent evidence
from natural and laboratory experiments suggests (see Section 4.3).
4.1 On pre-match behaviour
The basic setting considered in this paper – employers advertise non-negotiable wage offers
and then select job seekers in interviews – applies to many hiring processes in practice, as
suggested by three recent studies. Hall and Krueger (2012) present survey results from
a representative sample of 1,400 workers, collected in the United States in 2008. Brencˇicˇ
(2012) draws on administrative data from public and private job matching services. These
comprise data on 106,000 vacancies registered with the Employment Service of Slovenia
in 2001, on 4,400 vacancies registered with the Lancashire Careers Service in the United
Kingdom between 1988 and 1992, and on 140,000 vacancies advertised on Monster.com
in the United States in 2006. Brenzel, Gartner and Schnabel (2014) dispose of a random
sample of 9,300 employers in Germany who were included in the 2011 wave of the annual
German Job Vacancy Survey.
Hall and Krueger (2012) find that 32% of workers had known their wage exactly before
the first interview, and more than 80% either knew it exactly or had “a pretty good
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idea”. According to Brencˇicˇ (2012), 25% of the vacancies in the sample from the United
States included wage information, 30% of the vacancies in the sample from Slovenia,
and 86% in the sample from the United Kingdom (which were targeted at young job
seekers). Employers made a take-it-or-leave-it offer to 63% of workers surveyed in Hall and
Krueger (2012). Such posted wages were more frequent for workers with lower educational
attainment, as well as in the public sector. Among the workers who faced posted wages,
more than 40% exactly knew the wage in advance. Brenzel et al. (2014) similarly find
that 62% of employers in Germany had posted the wage for their most recently recruited
worker. Posted wages were used less for highly educated job seekers (44%), for already
employed job seekers (54%), and in cases when it was difficult to fill the job opening
(55%). Posted wages were used more often when the employer was subject to a collective
bargaining agreement (73%), and for job seekers who were unqualified (70%), unemployed
(68%) or under 25 years old (68%).
4.2 On post-match behaviour
The model in this paper allows matched workers to react to employers’ behaviour by low-
ering their work effort. Some of the first evidence was presented by Kaufman (1984) and
by Blinder and Choi (1990) based on small surveys among managers with a responsibility
for workers’ wages. Most of them did express fears that a wage cut would lead to bad
morale among workers and lower effort.
Since then, employers’ views on wage cuts have been surveyed on a larger scale. From
more than 300 interviews in the Northeast of the United States, Bewley (1998) concludes
that employers primarily avoid cutting wages because the adverse effects on morale would
reduce productivity while staff turnover would rise. Surveyed employers therefore rejected
wage cuts, expecting that the costs from these consequences would outweigh the savings
on wage payments. From a survey of close to 200 large firms in the United States,
Campbell and Kamlani (1997) conclude that employers fear lower effort especially among
blue-collar workers and higher turnover especially among white-collar workers. Based
on a representative survey of 900 wage setters in Swedish firms, Agell and Bennmarker
(2007) report that 49% of employers expected that workers would reduce their effort levels
following a wage cut, and another 30% considered this reaction possible.
A particularly large survey was carried out in 2007/08 by European central banks,
collecting responses from 17 000 firms in 17 countries of the European Union. The survey
used a standardised questionnaire with detailed questions on wage setting, and respon-
dents could choose from a range of prepared answers to indicate reasons for their practices
in wage setting. Results on firms’ reasons to avoid wage cuts (available for 14 countries)
are presented by du Caju et al. (2015) and reproduced in Figure 3. With little varia-
tion across countries, firm sizes and worker characteristics, two leading reasons emerged:
adverse effects on morale and effort, and fears that some workers might leave. Taken
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together, the survey evidence suggests that effects on morale and productivity are one of
two main reasons (alongside rising turnover) why employers avoid wage cuts. Both Agell
and Bennmarker (2007) and du Caju et al. (2015) can confirm that wage cuts remain very
rare, occurring in only about 3% of the surveyed firms.
Figure 3: Employers’ reasons for avoiding wage cuts
Share considering the reason “relevant” or “very relevant”, in percentages. Source: du Caju et al. (2015)
In the context of this paper, it is important to verify that wage cuts are rare also for
newly hired workers. Galuscak et al. (2012) focus on the wages of newly hired workers in
the large survey carried out by European central banks (in this case, data are available
for eight countries). They find that only 13% of surveyed firms pay lower wages to new
hires than to existing staff when labour market conditions allow. The main reason given
for not paying new hires a lower wage is again the adverse effect on their effort (cited
by 36% of surveyed firms), followed by concerns about fairness or the firm’s reputation
(33%) and collective bargaining agreements (28%). These results are in line with reports
in Bewley (1998) that, in order not to antagonise new hires, they are paid according to
the same standards as existing staff.
It is a different question whether employers are right to fear lower productivity fol-
lowing wage cuts. From detailed survey data on how workers in the United States use
their time at work, Burda et al. (2016) find that workers with lower wages spend a greater
share of their time at work not working. The effects of outright wage cuts have hardly
been studied. Lee and Rupp (2007) investigate the effect of cuts in the wages of pilots
working for major U.S. airlines, implemented between 2000 and 2005 when several air-
lines filed for bankruptcy. For pilots at some airlines, they find a significant reduction in
performance, measured by statistics on flight delays. For pilots whose airline was near
bankrupt, however, no change in performance was observed, and even the observed effects
appeared short-lived. These findings may reflect the specific situation of highly-paid pi-
lots in an industry threatened by bankruptcy: experimental evidence in Henning-Schmidt
et al. (2010) suggests that workers only reduce effort when their employer derives undue
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profits from the wage cut.
Other case studies provide more indirect evidence. Mas (2008) documents significant
deteriorations in product quality during disputes over pay between workers and employers
in a manufacturing firm, which resulted in sizeable financial losses. Based on an employer-
employee survey covering 123 firms in Japan, Kawaguchi and Ohtake (2007) document
that morale was significantly lower among workers who experienced decreasing nominal
wages. Smith (2015) uses the British Household Panel Survey to establish a causal link
between wage cuts and bad morale. In experiments, the link between wage cuts and
performance has been documented comparatively often. For example, a field experiment
conducted by Kube et al. (2013) produced evidence of large and persistent effects of wage
cuts on productivity: workers’ average output, measured by the number of books entered
into a database, fell by more than 20%.
4.3 On the link between pre-match and post-match behaviour
This section argues that workers’ productivity can also be affected when expected wages
are cut. If this is the case, then the wage expectations created by employers’ adver-
tisements (pre-match behaviour) will constitute a link to workers’ effort (post-match be-
haviour). This link is needed for the main theoretical result of this paper.
As workers’ expectations are not directly observable, a link with effort is difficult to
establish. The most relevant evidence is provided by Mas (2006) who studies indicators of
police performance in New Jersey after collective bargaining over police wages. The pay
rise demanded by the police union might create expectations, which are violated when
the pay rise ultimately found through arbitration turns out to be significantly lower.
Mas (2006) finds that police performance, measured e.g. by reported crimes and arrest
rates, sharply declined when arbitrators ruled against the police union. The larger the
difference between demanded pay rise and actual pay rise, the larger was the decline in
police performance. Changes in police performance were therefore not fully explained by
actual pay rises alone - also the demanded pay rise was empirically relevant. This strongly
suggests that violated wage expectations mattered when the police chose how much effort
to exert in their work.
Mas (2006) interpreted his findings as evidence for reference points, in this case created
by the demanded pay rises. Related evidence on expectations as reference points has been
obtained in several experiments. Ericson and Fuster (2011) document that subjects who
expect to receive an item with a higher probability value it more strongly in monetary
terms and are less likely to trade it. They conclude that expectations create an endowment
effect. Further results by Heffetz and List (2014) underline the role of induced changes in
expectations. In the context of this paper, their results suggest that wage expectations
induced by an advertisement can create a strong endowment effect, especially when it
contrasts with the ultimate wage offer. Consequences for the choice of effort have also been
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documented: in experiments that require subjects to exert measurable effort - counting
zeros in large tables - Abeler et al. (2011) find that significantly less effort is provided
when a lower wage payment is expected afterwards.
The literature on organizational behaviour has discussed related findings under the
notion of implicit contracts, i.e. the behaviour that employers and workers expect from
each other. The mutual expectations are partly based on information received during the
recruitment phase (see for example Rousseau and Greller, 1994), which notably includes
job advertisements. Several empirical studies such as Turnley and Feldman (2000) and
Wanous et al. (1992) found that, when expectations of new workers are not met, this has
adverse effects on their morale and their effort. As a result, they appeared to neglect not
only their job duties but in particular exhibited less organizational citizenship behaviour
beyond their immediate job duties. Such reactions may be interpreted as “work to rule”
or “white strike”. Robinson and Morrison (2000) document particularly strong reactions
from workers in cases when the employer was perceived to purposefully renege.
Together, the evidence presented on pre-match and post-match behaviour as well as
on the link between them implies that a wide range of employers should be concerned
about lower effort levels if they renege on advertised wages, which can explain why they
normally do not renege.
5 Conclusions
This paper has addressed an issue in directed search models: why do employers not pay
less than they advertised? The simple solution offered here is that employers could but
prefer not to because they fear adverse effects on workers’ morale and productivity. As
shown in the model of this paper, attempts to renege on advertised wages can easily
reduce the employer’s profit even though search frictions prevent the worker from leaving:
the worker can choose to exert only as much effort as is needed to keep the job.
Essentially, employer’s dependence on the worker’s effort during an employment rela-
tionship shapes the employer’s behaviour before employment begins, during the matching
process. Directed search models have thus far not captured this mechanism because they
only model the matching process. To capture the mechanism in this paper, a standard
directed search model was extended by a game-theoretic model of the employment rela-
tionship and placed in a dynamic setting. In this framework, it arises endogenously that
employers do not renege on their advertisements.
Thus far, it has been most common in directed search models to assume that employers
are somehow committed to their advertisements. The findings in this paper imply that
the results of these models should still hold when the assumption is relaxed - presumably,
employment relationships follow the matching process in each of these directed search
models, so that commitment can arise endogenously. Without exogenous or endogenous
commitment, directed search models suffer from the Diamond paradox: they collapse
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to a state in which workers do not engage in search. The explanation for endogenous
commitment provided in this paper therefore also offers an economic rationale why this
outcome is normally avoided in practice.
Finally, the mechanism at the core of this paper’s reasoning - that wage decreases
reduce workers’ morale and productivity - has been identified as leading reason for wage
rigidity by three decades of empirical research, and has likewise been confirmed by recent
experimental findings. Several contributions in the literature suggest that this mechanism
is not limited to decreases of actual wages but also applies to decreases of promised wages
as in this paper.
A Appendix: Omitted proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. The objective is to maximise Λ by taking the derivative of the
right-hand side of equation (16) with respect to σ. For reasons of presentation, consider
first the derivative of 1−(1−σ)
n
β−1F −(1−σ)n
. Using the quotient rule, this derivative is found as
n(1− σ)n−1
[
1
βF
− (1− σ)n
]
− [1− (1− σ)n]n(1− σ)n−1[
1
βF
− (1− σ)n
]2 = n(1− σ)n−1 1βF − 1[
1
βF
− (1− σ)n
]2
Next rewrite the remainder of the right-hand side of equation (16) as follows to make the
dependence on σ explicit:
1
1− βF
[
p(s)− d(s)− 1− βW
1−(1−σ)n
nσ
Φ
]
The derivative of this part is, by the quotient rule,[
−1− βW
1− βF Φ
] [
n(1− (1− σ)n)− n2σ(1− σ)n−1
[1− (1− σ)n]2
]
With the derivatives of the parts, one can put together the first-order condition for the
entire right-hand side of equation (16) according to the product rule:
n(1− σ)n−1
1
βF
− 1[
1
βF
− (1− σ)n
]2 11− βF
[
p(s)− d(s)− 1− βW
ρ
Φ
]
+
1− (1− σ)n
1
βF
− (1− σ)n
[
−1− βW
1− βF Φ
] [
n [1− (1− σ)n]− n [nσ(1− σ)n−1]
[1− (1− σ)n]2
]
= 0(25)
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Note that, with the definition of ρ in equation (1), the last term can be rewritten as
follows:
n [1− (1− σ)n]− n [nσ(1− σ)n−1]
[1− (1− σ)n]2 =
n
1− (1− σ)n
[
1− 1
ρ
(1− σ)n−1
]
Using this equivalence and dividing equation (25) by n and 1− βW before multiplying it
by 1− βF and 1βF − (1− σ)n leads to
(1− σ)n−1
1
βF
− 1
1
βF
− (1− σ)n
[
p(s)− d(s)
1− βW −
Φ
ρ
]
− Φ
[
1− 1
ρ
(1− σ)n−1
]
= 0
Now call
1
βF
−1
1
βF
−(1−σ)n = x and divide by (1− σ)n−1 to obtain
x
[
p(s)− d(s)
1− βW −
Φ
ρ
]
− Φ
[
(1− σ)1−n − 1
ρ
]
= 0
or x
[
p(s)− d(s)
1− βW
]
= Φ
[
1
ρ
(x− 1) + (1− σ)1−n
]
so that Φ =
x
1
ρ
(x− 1) + (1− σ)1−n
[
p(s)− d(s)
1− βW
]
The constraint in equation (15) requires
w − d(s) = 1− βW
ρ
Φ =
x
x− 1 + ρ(1− σ)1−n (p(s)− d(s))
using the result obtained for Φ. After substituting for x according to its definition and
multiplying by 1
βF
− (1− σ)n and then by βF , one obtains
w − d(s) = 1− βF
1− βF + [ρ(1− σ)1−n − 1] [1− βF (1− σ)n] (p(s)− d(s))
=
1− βF
ρ [(1− σ)1−n − βF (1− σ)]− βF [1− (1− σ)n] (p(s)− d(s))
=
1− βF
ρ [(1− σ)1−n − βF [1 + (n− 1)σ]] (p(s)− d(s))(26)
where the last step uses that 1− (1−σ)n = nσρ by the definition of ρ. As w− d(s) is the
worker’s per-period benefit, the expression obtained is the share of the surplus p(s)−d(s)
that employers advertise as benefit to workers. Note that the expression is the same
for every employer: in equilibrium, all employers choose the same combination of σ and
w−d(s), so that all offer the same Φ to workers. Workers therefore apply to one employer
at random, and each employer has a chance of σ = 1/m of receiving an application from
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a given worker. Substituting first for ρ and then for σ in equation (26), one obtains
(27) b˜ =
(1− βF ) nm[
1− (1− 1
m
)n] [(
1− 1
m
)1−n − βF (1 + n−1m )] (p(s)− d(s))
as given in equation (17). However, this b˜ may be too low to reimburse workers for their
search costs kW . The minimum per-period benefit employers have to advertise to attract
workers in expectation just reimburses them for their search costs, so that
b˜
1− βW = kW
which gives the other expression in equation (17). Hence b˜ is the maximum of these two
expressions. 
Proof of Lemma 2. Taking part (iii) of Proposition 1 as given means that employ-
ers do offer workers who visit them what they advertised. Workers therefore trust the
advertisements. Employers’ advertisements are specified in Lemma 1, and offer workers
a per-period benefit of at least (1 − βW )kW . The value to the worker of receiving this
per-period benefit in a match that does not break up is Φ = kW > 0. In general, the
value to the worker of being in the interview is Ω = max[Φ, Y ], as the worker can choose
to accept the match or to continue searching. To prove that Φ ≥ Y here, suppose to the
contrary that Y > Φ. Then the worker would always decide against the match and prefer
to continue searching. As the worker then never obtains any positive payoff, it follows
that Y ≤ 0. However, this yields a contradiction because Y > Φ is impossible if Y ≤ 0
and Φ > 0. Hence Φ ≥ Y and, by equation (5), Ω = Φ: the worker always accepts the
match, which proves that the worker matches at the first opportunity. As workers are
homogeneous, employers also wish to match at the first opportunity. Next substituting
Ω = Φ = kW in equation (4), one obtains
(28) Y = (1− ρ)βWY + ρβW max [0, Y ]
Using the same argument as before, Y > 0 is impossible, as the worker would then never
go to an interview, which implies Y = 0. Hence Y ≤ 0 so that workers prefer attending
interviews at least weakly, and they thus do engage in search. 
Proof of Lemma 3. The proof considers non-cooperation as a single deviation from
the equilibrium in Proposition 1 and proceeds by backward induction. In subperiod t2
of a match, the worker has already exerted effort. The employer can take advantage of
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the situation by not paying any wage. With w = 0, the per-period payoff for the worker
equals −d(s) ≤ 0, so that Φ(0−d(s)) ≤ 0. As the worker can instead obtain βWY ≥ 0 by
returning to search, not paying any wage will end the match. The lowest wage that retains
the worker in the match, denoted w, makes the worker indifferent between another match
period and returning to search: βWΦ(w − d(s)) = βWY . The employer prefers paying w
to not paying any wage whenever
(29) p(s)− w + βFΠ(s) ≥ p(s) + βFΛ or βF [Π(s)− Λ] ≥ w
which will hold if employers are sufficiently patient, i.e. βF ≥ w/[Π(s) − Λ]. Equation
(29) also gives the employer’s payoff as specified in Lemma 3, for a general s.
The level of w follows from the worker’s indifference. In the equilibrium in Proposition
1, employers leave workers with benefit b˜ in every period of the match, so that equation
(11) can be written as
(30) Y =
ρ
β−1W − (1− ρ)
[
b˜
1− βW − kW
]
Since the match does not break up if the employer pays w in every period, Φ(w− d(s)) =
[w− d(s)]/[1−βW ] in analogy to equation (12). Indifference between βWΦ(w− d(s)) and
βWY therefore requires:
(31) w = (1− βW )Y + d(s)
Substituting for Y from equation (30) gives the expression in Lemma 3 for a general s.
By backward induction, the worker can anticipate the employer’s behaviour and choose
the level of s accordingly. If the worker sets s = 0, the employer cannot obtain a positive
per-period payoff p(s)−w. To avoid a loss, the employer will not pay any wage and instead
obtain βFΛ > 0 by returning to search. Anticipating that the employer is prepared to
pay a wage w so that the worker does not gain from match break-up, the worker also
seeks to avoid match break-up by choosing the lowest effort that retains the employer in
the match, denoted s. The worker’s optimisation problem is therefore to maximise the
benefit while ensuring that equation (29) just holds:
max
s
w − d(s) subject to w = βF [Π(s)− Λ]
The constraint can be rewritten as
w =
βF
1− βF [p(s)− (1− βW )Y − d(s)]− βFΛ
using equation (31). After substituting for w in maxsw − d(s) and noting that Y and Λ
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are given equilibrium values, the first-order condition requires for s that
(32)
δp(s)
δs
=
1
βF
δd(s)
δs
By contrast, equation (9) requires for s¯ that
(33)
δp(s)
δs
=
δd(s)
δs
Since 1/βF > 1, the left-hand side of equation (32) exceeds that of equation (33). By the
strict concavity of p(·), the equality in equation (32) must occur at a lower level of s than
the equality in equation (33). Therefore, s < s¯.
The choices s and w form a Nash equilibrium in the match period because unilateral
deviations are not profitable. If the employer deviates to a lower wage than w, the match
will break up; however, effort level s was chosen such that the employer does not gain
from match break-up. If the employer deviates to a higher wage, the match continues but
the employer’s per-period payoff decreases. Similarly, if the worker deviates to a lower
effort level than s, the match will break up but w was chosen such that the worker does
not gain from match break-up. If the worker deviates to a higher effort level, the employer
will adjust the wage as given in Lemma 3 to reflect the increase in d(s), but the worker
would still be left with the same benefit w − d(s).
Since match break-up is avoided, this Nash equilibrium is repeated in every match
period, and the infinite repetition of a Nash equilibrium is by definition a SPE of the
repeated game. All this is independent of the employer’s choice of wˆ in t0, so that wˆ may
take any value in R+. 
Proof of Lemma 4. Let players use grim trigger strategies as follows. In each period
t0, the employer offers wˆ = b˜ + d(s¯) and demands s = s¯ if there has been no earlier
deviation by either side. In each period t1, the worker chooses s = s¯ unless there was a
deviation. In each period t2 the employer pays b˜+ d(s¯) unless there was a deviation.
If there was a deviation by either side, players either switch to the SPE in lemma 3
or leave the match and return to search. If the employer deviated by offering or paying
some wage w ≥ w or the worker deviated to some effort s ≥ s, players switch to the
SPE in lemma 3: the worker instead chooses s = s, the employer chooses w = w (with wˆ
indeterminate), and likewise in every subsequent period. As noted before, any SPE must
also be a NE, and therefore the threat of switching is credible. In case a deviation involves
offering or paying a lower wage than w or lower effort than s, worker and employer react
by not working and not paying, respectively, and the match breaks up.
The threat of these actions can sustain a SPE with s = s¯ and w = b˜ + d(s¯) if
both players prefer not to deviate. The worker prefers not to deviate to s ≥ s because
26
Φ(b) = b/(1 − βW ) would decrease: slightly rewriting equation (21) gives the benefit in
the mutually detrimental SPE as
(34) w − d(s) = ρ
β−1W − (1− ρ)
[
b˜− (1− δ)kW
]
< b˜
where the inequality holds because b˜ − (1 − δ)kW < b˜, while ρ/(β−1W − (1 − ρ)) is the
probability of having an interview (see equation (11), for example) and is therefore smaller
than 1. Rearranging the inequality in equation (34) gives b˜ + d(s) > w which implies
b˜+ d(s¯) > w as claimed in Lemma 4 because d(s) < d(s¯) follows from s < s¯ (see Lemma
3). By consequence, Φ(b˜) > Φ(w − d(s)). As the worker is indifferent between staying
and leaving in the SPE in Lemma 3, also Φ(b˜) > Y so that the worker does not prefer to
deviate to some effort s < s either.
Similarly to equation (29), the employer prefers not to deviate whenever the non-
deviation payoff at least matches the payoffs from paying w and thereby moving to the
SPE in Lemma 3 and from paying nothing and thereby ending the match:
(35) p(s¯)− b˜− d(s¯) + βFΠ(s¯) ≥ max [p(s¯)− w + βFΠ(s), p(s¯) + βFΛ]
The first expression on the right-hand side exceeds the second whenever
βF [Π(s)− Λ] ≥ w
which is the same condition as in equation (29). Therefore the second expression can be
ignored provided βF ≥ w/[Π(s)− Λ]. Then equation (35) leads to:
(36) βF ≥ b˜+ d(s¯)− w
Π(s¯)− Π(s)
Lemma 4 requires βF to meet both of these two thresholds. Which one is higher depends
on parameter values that determine b˜ and the worker?s benefit included in w. Finally,
Π(s¯) > Π(s) if
p(s¯)− b˜− d(s¯) + βFΠ(s¯) > p(s)− w + βFΠ(s)
which must hold whenever equation (35) holds, as it only differs by p(s¯) > p(s) on the
right-hand side. Π(s¯) > Λ follows from Π(s) > Λ in Lemma 3. Hence both players do not
deviate if the employer is sufficiently patient, and matches do not break up. 
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